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Both the mugger and the tax collector take some of our money, whether
we like it or not. But our response to them differs (unless we adhere to
anarchism or radical libertarianism). Whereas we respond to the mugger
with outrage, our response to the tax collector involves a certain sort of
respectful attention (even if combined with a bit of healthy irritation). In
order to explain and justify the difference in our attitudes, Philip Soper
proposes to generate a definition of law that entails a prima facie (though
not necessarily overriding) obligation to obey its mandate.' The book de-
velops the notion that legal theory and political theory ought to be con-
nected: An answer to the question of what law is should explain why we
have some reason (apart from fear of sanctions) to obey the law. This
assumption contrasts starkly with the prevalent contemporary approach,
which assumes that one can describe the nature of legal systems without
presuming a prima fade obligation to obey the law. Indeed, a popular
approach to legal theory often issues in a negative result in political the-
ory-the conclusion that we have no prima fade obligation to obey the
law.2
Soper begins by criticizing various approaches to legal theory on the
grounds that they cannot adequately distinguish law from mere force or
coercion (the tax collector from the mugger). He then proposes a certain
condition (absent from various legal theories) as necessary for a normative
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model of law: Officials must make a good faith claim that legal directives
serve the common good.' Further, Soper posits this feature in conjunction
with a second condition-that citizens recognize the enterprise of law as
preferable to the state of nature-as jointly sufficient to generate an obli-
gation to obey the law. Soper thus develops what he calls a "political
theory." Employing these two ingredients, Soper constructs a theory of
law which shows "what law must be if it is to obligate." 4 The first part of
this review sets out what I take to be Soper's theory. The second part
presents a critique and a suggestion for a revision of the theory.
I. SOPER'S THEORY OF LAW
A. Legal Theory
The legal theorist, according to Soper, seeks to provide a definition of a
legal system, not just a description or characterization of actual legal sys-
tems.' Thus, the legal theorist must uncover the essential features of a
legal system. Austin's classical positivistic explanation identifies the es-
sence of law with command: laws are orders backed by threats.6 A poten-
tial problem with Austin's command theory stems from its inability to
distinguish the mugger from the tax collector. Both issue orders backed by
threats, but our attitude toward the tax collector differs significantly from
our attitude toward the mugger.
Such positivists as Kelsen and Hart attempt to improve on Austin's the-
ory by adding a normative element.7 A "normative" system seeks compli-
ance primarily for reasons other than the fear of threatened sanctions. In
order to transcend the coercive model, however, the modern positivist
must, first, define a normative attitude on the part of both officials and
participants distinct from that minimal normative (uncoerced) attitude
"implicit in any exercise of de facto power."" Second, and more impor-
tantly, the modern positivist must present this stronger normative element
as an essential aspect of a legal system. Otherwise, Soper claims, the en-
deavors of the positivist will have contributed nothing to the definition of
law and will have lacked any relevance whatever to the participants who
interact in the legal system and have an interest in knowing why the law
qua law obligates.
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type of normative attitude toward law-a moral one-from the minimal
attitude of voluntary acceptance that one finds even in the case of gang-
sters."9 Yet Kelsen identifies the normative attitude toward the law as a
presupposed basic norm "according to which one ought to behave in con-
formity with the [legal] order."10 Kelsen's basic norm appears to be no
more than a general moral attitude of acceptance of the existing regime.
Kelsen provides no further explication of the basic norm except for the
observation that the norm exists in orders that have some "lasting effec-
tiveness." ' Soper argues that Kelsen's claim that the appropriate moral
attitude arises in a regime with lasting effectiveness qualifies neither as a
semantic truth, "such as the claim that bachelors are unmarried men,"
nor as a universally true empirical generalization, "such as that all swans
are white." 2 Thus, Soper claims that Kelsen has not met the second re-
quirement for transcending the coercive model: identifying the normative
as a necessary aspect of the law.
Hart attempts to transcend the coercive model through "variations on a
theme sounded by Kelsen [which] consist almost entirely of a more de-
tailed description of the normative attitude that characterizes rules of obli-
gation and of legal order."1" Hart claims that laws are rules accepted by
officials. As Soper points out, Hart's description of the citizen's obligation
to obey the law differs considerably from his description of the official's
obligation to enforce the rules. 4 Thus, in Soper's view, Hart makes a
significant distinction between the normative attitude of the officials and
that of the citizen:
Rules of obligation of citizens are characterized by serious socialpressure to act in ways that are thought essential to a prized feature
of social life and that typically conflict with self-interest. In contrast,
official acceptance of rules "may be based on many different consid-
erations: calculation of long-term interest; disinterested interest in
others; an unreflecting inherited or traditional attitude; or the mere
wish to do as others do."1 5
Soper criticizes Hart's characterization of the two obligations as differ-
ent. In particular, he objects to the weakness of the requisite attitude on
the part of the officials. If rule acceptance by officials can consist of noth-
ing more than allegiance to a system for reasons of self-interest, "even to
9. P. 28.
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the point of their openly admitting that 'morally, they ought not to accept'
the system but 'for a variety of reasons continue to do so,"'
16 then the
attitude of officials need not differ from that implicit in the coercive model
(the command theory). Their obligations (as well as those of citizens)
thus, may consist of nothing more than "prudential obligations."
1 7 If offi-
cials can harbor such attitudes toward the law, then citizens need not have
even prima facie moral obligations to obey the law, and "You ought to
obey the tax man" becomes the normative equivalent of the mugger's
"You ought to hand over your money." 8
Hart, thus, goes a step further than Kelsen in complying with the first
requirement for transcending the coercive model: Hart describes more spe-
cifically the normative element in the law. But his description allows that
officials fail to have a belief in the justice of the laws and, consequently,
does not explain why citizens (or "insiders" in the legal process) are obli-
gated to obey the law qua law.
Soper thus explains the positivist's reluctance to posit a particular kind
.of normative attitude as essential to the concept of law:
[T]o defend the conceptual claim about law and the belief in jus-
tice, one must similarly be able to explain why it might matter to
people that this particular attitude toward law should exist. In doing
so, one may find it impossible to avoid engaging in evaluation and
substantive moral argument, departing from the purity of the positiv-
ist's program to account for the importance of the attitude toward
the law in the only way that makes sense-from the viewpoint of the
insider himself."9
The problem with positivism (at least as presented by such theorists as
Austin, Kelsen, and Hart), according to Soper, is that it "purports to
identify law but fails to explain how it differs from force."' 20 Conversely,
the classical natural law theorist (who accepts the slogan that unjust law
is not law) can distinguish force from obligation, but he cannot "identify
law apart from the substantive moral inquiry into justice. '2' This sort of
natural law position runs counter to our intuition that directives can be
legal, and indeed can generate obligation, even if they are not substan-
tively just.
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Soper discusses very briefly the ideas of two contemporary legal theo-
rists in the natural law tradition-Fuller and Dworkin. "2 These theorists
insist upon some inherent connection between law and morality. Although
disagreeing with particular features of their accounts of law, Soper distills
from their approaches the idea that officials have an obligation to justify
their legal decisions (and their applications of rules) and to do so by refer-
ence to an underlying moral and political theory.2"
For Soper, the accounts of Fuller and Dworkin point to the main ele-
ment lacking in legal positivism: a sincere belief by the officials that the
legal directives are morally justified-a belief that they "aim at serving
the common good." '24 In Soper's view:
It is this claim of justice, rather then [sic] justice in fact, that one
links conceptually with the idea of law. . . .With the positivist one
may agree that the actual justice or injustice of a system of norms
does not determine whether the system is legal; with the non-
positivist one shares the conviction that a legal system is more than a
set of effectively enforced norms, voluntarily accepted by officials and
summarily imposed on subjects.25
Soper asserts that this attitude of officials constitutes the ingredient re-
quired in order for law to obligate citizens.
B. Political Theory
Soper turns to what he calls "political theory" to justify his claim that
the ingredient he proposes to add to legal theory, the good faith claim of
officials that their directives serve the common good, is not only necessary
in order to generate obligation, but also that, when combined with another
condition, the recognition of the enterprise of law as preferable to the state
of nature, this ingredient is sufficient to generate obligation.2" Soper iden-
22. Fuller and Dworkin present their theories respectively in L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW (1963) and R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
23. Although Dworkin goes further and claims that the moral justification should take a certain
form-requiring judicial intervention only and always to protect determinable, pre-existing
rights-Soper does not insist upon this view about the content of the justification.
24. P. 55.
25. P. 55 (footnote omitted).
26. According to Soper:
I have thus far shown only that any theory of law that lacks this feature will be unable to
distinguish legal from coercive systems and will distort many of the persistent features of the
normative attitude toward law that one finds among both subjects and rulers. In that sense the
official claim to justice would be a necessary feature of a normative model of law even if
description alone were the goal. But the more meaningful goal, I have said, is definition. Thus
there remains the task of explaining why this feature is essential to the idea of law. Accord-
ingly, Chapter III shows that the requirement of an official claim of justice is necessary and, in
conjunction with a second condition, sufficient for political obligation.
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tifies the fundamental question of political theory as "Why do I have a
prima facie obligation to obey the law?" In his attempt to justify the atti-
tude of "minimal respect" for the law, Soper begins by discussing the
deficiencies of various standard approaches to political theory. He then
presents an alternative account which proposes two features of a legal sys-
tem as sufficient to generate legal obligation.
Soper first explores the "utilitarian defense of obligation":
1. Legal systems, by providing minimal protection for life, lib-
erty, and property, are preferable to the alternative of no law at all.
2. No legal system can survive in the face of widespread
disobedience.
3. Therefore one has a primafacie obligation to obey the laws of
any legal system.2
7
Soper finds this argument unpersuasive because the utilitarian's obedience
emerges from a desire to avoid an unfortunate outcome and not from the
nature of law itself.2" Political theory demands an answer to the question
of why I should obey law qua law.
2 9
Soper next argues that consent-based arguments also fail to account for
political obligation for familiar reasons. Few people give explicit consent,
and one cannot plausibly suppose that their behavior indicates tacit con-
sent.30 Arguments from estoppel fail as well because others do not rely on
my conforming to the law; others fear sanctions, and so they will conform
to the law even if they know that I will not.3'
Soper goes on to consider the argument from unjust enrichment (a ver-
sion of which draws from Rawls' and Hart's "principle of fair play").3
This general argument derives an obligation to obey the law from the
notion that accepting the benefits of a legal system without reciprocating
with allegiance to the system constitutes unjust enrichment. Soper high-
P. 56. This summary of his overall strategy is somewhat confusing. If Soper has (in the Chapter on
Legal Theory-Chapter II) already shown that any theory of law lacing the official attitude of
justice will be unable to distinguish law from mere force, then he has already shown that this feature
is necessary, if law is to obligate. Thus, I believe that Chapter Three (Political Theory) is better
conceived as being addressed to the sufficiency claim.
27. P. 60. Soper claims that M.B.E. Smith attributes this argument to the utilitarian.
28. The argument is invalid because the premises connect widespread disobedience with the loss
of benefits from a legal system but the argument concludes that one should obey particular laws. The
argument implicitly, yet untenably, presupposes that any particular violation of a law threatens de-
struction of the entire system.
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lights what he considers the critical flaw in this argument: Since not all
submissions to law are beneficial, the argument does not generate a gen-
eral obligation to obey. I would have an obligation to obey laws that ben-
efit others but not necessarily all laws. This argument fails to give an
account of one's prima fade obligation to obey law qua law.
But Soper believes that we can learn from the failure of the unjust
enrichment paradigm. Unjust enrichment theory applies an argument to
particular laws that could more appropriately apply to the total system of
laws. Soper uses this point to construct his theory of political obligation.
Though one cannot maintain submission to each law as beneficial, one
could plausibly suppose that to have some state-some legal system-is
better than to have none.33 Soper's theory of political obligation thus dif-
fers from both the paradigms of consent and unjust enrichment. In con-
structing his theory, Soper claims to be "directly appealing to the beliefs
and attitudes of rational individuals in situations analogous to the situa-
tions confronted in the case of law."'34
In developing his political theory, Soper also borrows from the unjust
enrichment paradigm's approach to the motivation and behavior of par-
ticipants in the legal system. "The strength of the argument from unjust
enrichment," Soper insists, "depends largely on the motives and actions of
both the benefactor and the recipient."3" Political obligation, in the con-
text of such argument, seems most plausible in cases in which the benefac-
tor acts in good faith and the recipient values the benefits bestowed. So-
per's conception also makes such attitudes on the part of 'benefactors' and
'recipients' the touchstone for political obligation.
Soper uses the analogy between the obligation to obey one's parents and
the obligation to obey the law. He claims that the obligation to obey one's
parents arises "not from what they have done for me"36 but rather out of
a separate concern for one's parents. At one extreme, there is one's love of
one's parents:
At the other extreme the appeal need be only to the child's recog-
nition of the value of some family, some parent or guardian, com-
pared to the alternative of none at all. . . .To this basis for respect
for the general enterprise one need add only one additional require-
ment in order also to lay a basis for respect for the particular person
and particular enterprise: the requirement that the parent is trying
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in good faith to act in the interests of the child by acting in the
interests of the family as a whole."7
Soper thus lists the pertinent features of the confrontation with the law
(and with one's parents) as follows: 1) There is a job that I concede must
be done, and 2) The person who happens to be in charge is trying to do
that job in good faith, taking my interests equally into account along with
the interests of others who also find themselves part of the same scheme.38
Soper claims that, in such situations, the desires of the authorities that I
conform generate a prima fade obligation for me to conform-an obliga-
tion of "respect."
Stated more specifically, the two features of legal systems that suffice to
generate obligation are: 1) Having a legal system is preferable to no law
at all, and 2) Those in charge are making a sincere effort to govern
justly.3 9 Of course, the second feature coincides with the feature identified
in the discussion of legal theory as necessary for the distinction between
law and mere force.
Now let us return to the question of what distinguishes the tax collector
from the mugger. A mugger who does not purport to serve the interests of
his victim (presumably the typical mugger) we justly greet with outrage.
But how about a mugger who sincerely believes his actions serve the inter-
ests of all, including his victim? We still do not respond to this mugger
with respect, and Soper claims that we do not because the mugger does
not represent an effective and uniquely established social force-a
sovereign. °
So the sincere claim to be ruling justly does not suffice to generate obli-
gation. Obligation also requires the establishment of effective power,
which produces an acceptable level of order and security. On this account,
a gang of robbers could become a legal system to which one owes obedi-
ence in virtue of 1) having a monopoly of force, which produces order,
and 2) sincerity in believing that it is ruling justly.41 With respect to gen-
erating obligation, Soper argues that this gang of robbers is relevantly
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C. Clarifications and Implications.
What if a system established order but the rulers made no claim to rule
justly (or made an obviously insincere claim of this sort)? Under Soper's
theory, since such a system would not generate obligation, the system
would not count as law. Although one might feel inclined to consider this
system a legal system (even if an objectionable one), Soper's considered
view is that one could reasonably doubt the legality of such a system,
though he does not purport to establish that the system is not legal. One
might have different interests in defining a legal system. There is first the
interest of the person who wishes to avoid sanctions-or at least predict
their incidence. Holmes identified this interest with that of the "bad
man," and the bad man's interest here coincides with that of the prudent
man.4 3 Relative to this interest, the system in question should qualify as
legal. But the desire to produce a legal theory might arise from another,
equally important, interest-the interest of the moral person in knowing
what he ought to do."" Soper claims to have shown (in his discussion of
legal and political theory) how the expectations of officials can create
moral obligations only in certain circumstances. Hence, with respect to the
interest of the moral person in knowing what he ought to do, a purely
coercive system need not be characterized as legal. Soper has identified an
interest at least as important as that of avoiding sanctions which might
lead to inclusion of the proposed ingredient in the definition of law.
Soper discusses various applications and implications of his theory. He
claims that the theory has the interesting consequence of allowing for the
derivation of certain "natural rights." According to Soper, natural rights
are "rights against the state which can be invaded or ignored only at the
cost of losing the title of law.' 45 The natural right to minimal order and
security, for example, derives from the first requirement for political obli-
gation: the preferability of the enterprise of law over the absence of law. A
system that does not afford individuals minimum safety has no claim to
superiority over anarchy and consequently cannot obligate so as to qualify
as legal in Soper's theory.
The requirement of sincere belief in justice generates a "right to dis-
course." Soper argues that the legality of, and thus the obligation created
by, a system depends on the existence of a sincere belief by officials in the
justice of the ruler. The officials holding such a belief must be willing to
respond to normative challenge with normative justification of their coer-
43. For a useful discussion of Holmes' bad man, see Wilcox, Taking a Good Look at the Bad
Man's Point of View, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1058 (1981).
44. P. 92.
45. P. 132.
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cive orders; sincere belief by officials implies willingness to engage in a
certain sort of normative discourse. Thus, a directive issued by a sovereign
who does not permit discourse is not a legal directive-and therefore vio-
lates an individual's natural rights.
II. AN EVALUATION OF SOPER'S THEORY
Soper attacks positivism for failing to specify the nature of the norma-
tive attitude on the part of officials in systems classified as legal. For the
positivist, officials of a legal system may have any normative attitude. So-
per proposes to replace this requirement with a more demanding one. A
weak formulation of the requirement would go as follows: Officials must
sincerely believe in the moral justifiability of their directives. This formu-
lation would state that the officials' normative attitude must be sincere and
involve a claim to moral justification. A stronger formulation of the re-
quirement would provide that rulers sincerely believe that their directives
serve "the common good" (or "the interest of all"). This formulation
would require that officials hold a sincere moral belief of a certain sort
(though one may define the common interest in numerous ways). At dif-
ferent points in the book, Soper uses different formulations; as I shall try
to show, they seem to have different implications.
If rulers adopt prudence as a ruling strategy but do not believe in the
moral justifiability of their strategy (they might deem their behavior
amoral or immoral), then they might simply be pursuing policies which
favor their own interests (or which they believe will do so). Some of what
Soper says suggests that such rulers do not deserve to be obeyed because
they lack a sincere belief in the morality of their directives. He says:
If legal systems may be based solely on rulers' self-interest, even to
the point of their openly admitting that 'morally, they ought not to
accept' the system but 'for a variety of reasons continue to do so,'
there is no possibility for further dialogue between rulers and dis-
senting subjects.4
Soper seems to suggest that the fact that the rulers consistently advance
their own interest points to the fact that they do not have a sincere moral
belief in the correctness of their directives. This latter fact inhibits the
emergence of a sense of obligation toward the rulers.
The weak version only requires that the officials hold a sincere moral
belief in the correctness of their decisions, but not necessarily that the
officials believe such decisions serve the "common good." Indeed, rulers
46. P. 39 (footnote omitted).
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might consider a given policy both morally justified and in their own best
interest. They may, for instance, adhere to moral egoism or class egoism
or to any number of elitist or racist moral theories positing certain privi-
leges for individuals with characteristics they possess. Such rulers would
satisfy the weak version of the requirement.
To illustrate the implausibility of the weak version of the constraint,
consider a ruler who pursues self-interested policies and indeed regards
them as not morally justified. Call him Ruler I. Suppose that Ruler II
pursues exactly the same (self-interested) policies but does so believing in
their moral justifiability (but not in virtue of their serving the common
good). Let us further say that Ruler II realizes that his policies are se-
verely harmful to the interests of some groups (even in the long-term).
Under the weak version of Soper's constraint, Ruler II's regime classifies
as a legal system (given that the regime achieves minimal security) but
Ruler I's does not. The distinction here between law and coercion derives
not from the content of the policies but merely from their official
justification.47
This weak construal of the requirement of sincere belief by officials in
the moral correctness of their rules renders Soper's legal theory inade-
quate. Why exactly should the difference in attitudes between Rulers I
and II make only Ruler II's society legal? Could one plausibly suppose
that, with respect to the purely factual question of what law is, one should
distinguish between the two societies? I do not see why. The only way in
which one could make the difference significant, as far as I can see, con-
sists in assuming that legal systems must obligate (as, of course, Soper
does).
So let us make this assumption and again ask whether we ought to
classify as legal Ruler II's society but not Ruler I's. I still resist the dis-
tinction between the two societies. Suppose I am a black person and both
societies have apartheid. Now why should the fact that Ruler II has a
belief in the moral correctness of apartheid generate an obligation for me
to obey him, whereas I would have no obligation to obey Ruler I? After
all, the policy is equally objectionable (and against my interests) in both
cases, and both rulers sincerely realize this.
47. I assume that Ruler I deems the policies "normatively" (though not morally) correct. One
might wonder how a belief in the moral correctness of a policy can differ from a belief in the mere
normative correctness of the same policy. I do not know exactly how to characterize the nature of
moral beliefs, but a common attempt consists in characterizing them in terms of such properties as
generalizability or "ultimacy." That is, some would say that moral rules must be generalizable in a
way in which other rules, say the rules of prudence, need not be. And some (though not all) would
argue that moral reasons provide "overriding" or "sufficient" reasons for action. However exactly one
characterizes moral judgments, Sopr reasonably assumes that one ruler might deem a certain policy
morally justified, whereas another, such as Ruler I, might deem the same policy normatively though
not morally justified.
The Yale Law Journal
It is true that Ruler I falls prey to a certain sort of criticism to which
Ruler II does not. A person who acts against his moral beliefs is criticiz-
able for doing so. But this difference between the two rulers does not seem
to generate an asymmetry in my obligations to them. Neither purports to
serve my interests. I believe, then, that the weak construal of the con-
straint makes Soper's legal theory unpersuasive-the theory unreasonably
distinguishes between Rulers I and II.
Interestingly, when Soper argues that his constraint provides the ingre-
dient that (together with the security condition) generates a sufficient con-
dition for obligation, he seems to have the stronger constraint in mind.
When he argues that his two conditions suffice to generate obligation, he
often supposes that the ruler believes that the directives are not merely
morally justified, but also in the interests of all. Using the stronger formu-
lation, Soper says:
Instead of interpreting the definition to limit 'law' to those ordi-
nances that do in fact serve the common good, one interprets it in-
stead to require only that legal directives aim at serving the common
good, however wide of the mark they may fall. Legal systems are
essentially characterized by the belief in value, the claim in good
faith by those who rule that they do so in the interests of all."'
Also, he says such things as: "One must be able to imagine rulers con-
fronted with a discrepancy between their own narrow interests and the
interest of those they rule and choosing in the face of that discrepancy to
pursue the latter. Such a choice results in law and obligation. And later
"[a]s a result, the second test for obligation-the sincerity of the attempt
[of the ruler] to rule in the other's best interests-becomes once again the
critical test for the citizen."
'50
If Soper's conditions suffice to generate obligation, they do so only
under the stronger interpretation of the "sincere moral belief" constraint.
I believe that his claim that the conditions suffice for obligation relies
(sometimes implicitly) on the stronger interpretation. However, even on
the stronger interpretation, the conditions might not suffice to generate
obligation.
Let us imagine that Ruler III sincerely believes that apartheid serves
the best interests of everyone, including those of the black community.
Does his sincere belief that his directives serve my interests generate a




Vol. 95: 437, 1985
Obligation and Mutual Respect
actual effects of the policies. One could argue that the sincere belief that
the policy furthers my interests generates a prima facie obligation, even if
the actual effect of the policy creates an all-things-considered obligation
not to obey. So let us grant that a sincere belief by Ruler III that his
directives are not only morally justified but advance my interests, together
with the security condition, suffices to generate a prima facie (though not
necessarily overriding) reason for me to obey.
One cannot, however, consider this condition as necessary for law. It
seems too much to demand that rulers believe that their directives benefit
all classes (or serve the "common good") for a system to qualify as legal.
Ruler IV may believe in the moral justifiability of his policies, and that
they systematically favor certain classes of individuals both in the short-
term and the long-term. Further, I assume that Ruler IV believes that the
policy does not create excessive hardships for any group, and that, in fact,
the policy does not create such hardships (as opposed, say, to slavery or
apartheid). Surely, one should classify such a system as a legal system.
But if so, then the criterion of sincere official belief that the directives
benefit all groups cannot constitute a necessary condition for law, at least
on a natural interpretation of what it is to "benefit all groups" or "serve
the common good.""1
What is the difference between Rulers II and IV, in virtue of which I
claim that I would owe Ruler IV but not Ruler II obedience? They both
lack the belief that their policies serve the common good. But Ruler II
realizes that his policies are actually severely detrimental to a certain
class, the black people. In contrast, although Ruler IV does not consider
his policies maximally beneficial to the disadvantaged group, he does not
see them as severely detrimental to this group either. Perhaps the follow-
ing explains the difference between my attitudes toward Rulers II and IV:
Ruler II believes that his polices (though morally justified) significantly
harm me, whereas Ruler IV holds no such belief. Perhaps the ruler's be-
lief about the severity of the deprivation to me makes the difference-the
ruler need not believe that he is maximally serving me, but perhaps he
must believe that he is at least protecting certain basic interests of mine.
In this way, he shows me at least "minimal respect."
The example of Ruler IV suggests a revision of Soper's constraint
which seems to be in the spirit of his approach: The officials must believe
51. Soper might reply that anyone who believes that a policy is morally justified ipso facto be-
lieves that it is in the "best interests of all." Under this view, there is no difference in meaning
between claiming that a policy is morally justified and that it is in the best interest of all. (Sopor
seems to make this move on pp. 120-21.) Whereas this move would block my objection that the
conditions are not necessary, it would dilute the concept of believing a policy to be in the common
interest and collapse the two interpretations. The objection would again be that the two conditions are
not sufficient to yield obligation.
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that their directives are morally justified and do not impose severe or ex-
cessive burdens on any class. This interpretation of the constraint is some-
what less demanding than the "strong" interpretation of Soper's con-
straint, but more demanding than the weak interpretation. I am not sure,
however, whether Soper would accept such an interpretation or whether it
adequately explains legal obligation.
My discussion so far can be summarized as follows. Soper presents two
conditions-a "security" condition and a "sincere belief" condi-
tion-which he considers jointly necessary and sufficient for any legal sys-
tem that obligates. But one can interpret the sincere belief condition either
weakly or strongly. If interpreted weakly, Soper's legal theory fails-he
must distinguish between one's obligation to Rulers I and II. A moral
belief by the official does not generate obligation simply qua moral belief.
Thus, the conditions do not jointly suffice to obligate. The sincere belief
condition, interpreted strongly, commits Soper to saying that I owe obedi-
ence to Ruler III. Even if this is plausible, the conditions are now not
jointly necessary; one would not owe Ruler IV obedience on this theory.
The stronger interpretation enhances the sufficiency claim but undermines
the necessity claim. On my suggestion, officials must sincerely believe both
that their orders are morally justified and that they do not impose signifi-
cant burdens on any class. This suggestion has some hope of providing
both a necessary and a sufficient condition for obligation.
Let us look more carefully at the possibility that a sincere belief in the
moral correctness of the directives converts force into law. I have claimed
that the mere fact that officials sincerely believe themselves capable of
morally justifying a directive does not generate obligations on the part of
citizens-one doesn't owe obedience to Ruler II rather than Ruler I. But I
have agreed that Ruler I is accessible to a certain sort of criticism to
which Ruler II is not: He is acting against his moral beliefs. We might
want to say that we respect Ruler II in a way that we do not respect
Ruler I. Insofar as obligation might come from respect, can this justify the
claim that Ruler II deserves obedience?
I do not believe so, since there is as yet no mutual respect. Nothing in
Ruler II's behavior evinces any respect for me, and though he is perhaps
more laudable than Ruler I, it remains unclear why this would generate
any sort of obligation on my part. (In contrast, one may construe Ruler
III's belief that his policies advance my interest as showing respect for
me.) Soper does, however, suggest a kind of argument which might estab-
lish the required attitude on the part of Ruler I. He says:
It is not the actual correctness or justice of the purposes invoked
that is crucial to law but the fact that purposes are invoked at
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all-that reason and justification rather than fiat and will dominate
the manner in which rules are formulated, defended, modified, and
reformulated. The conceptual claim need only be that there is a link
between law and a particular process of rule justification rather than
between law and any particular substantive outcome that may result
from the process.5 2
On one version of Soper's theory, he holds that sincere moral belief
generates respect and thus obligation; but now a certain willingness to
defend the belief appears to generate the obligation. This version would
follow from the first if sincere moral belief implied a willingness to discuss
and defend the belief. But sincere moral belief obviously does not imply a
willingness to engage in discourse. A willingness to engage in discourse
follows only from certain substantive propositions of moral theory.
Soper himself is aware of the problem raised above, saying, "[o]ne is
tempted to ask which is the more important ingredient in the argument
for obligation: sincerity or mutual tolerance?"53 In response, he says two
different things. First, "[d]iscourse is necessary to ensure that belief is
honest, particularly in light of the ease with which self-deception is possi-
ble."54 But of course this means that in order for me to know that I have
an obligation, the ruler must engage in discourse with me; the argument
does not show that the obligation itself comes from the discourse. Second,
Soper says, "[b]ut discourse is also necessary because the reason that hon-
est belief deserves respect stems from the individual's recognition of and
tolerance for value disagreement; if that recognition and tolerance is not
mutual, obligation again does not result."'55
Soper's considered view here seems to imply that obligation derives not
from mere sincerity of moral belief, but from the willingness to engage in
a certain sort of discourse. I wish to make two points about this claim.
First, if one identifies this as Soper's considered view, then his theory in-
volves a much stronger claim than it might appear to, given many of his
formulations and comments. Just any sincere moral belief (even a belief in
the justice of rules) on the part of officials will not do. Officials must have
a particular substantive moral belief, the belief in "tolerance for value
disagreement" and the advisability of discourse.
Second, even given this stronger claim, I do not think that we have
isolated a sufficient condition for obligation. Consider again Ruler II. He
has a sincere belief in the moral justifiability of apartheid. In addition,
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my objections. Yet he continues to believe (sincerely) that the policies do
not serve my interest, and of course, they do not serve my interest. And we
can suppose that he will most likely not change any of his views as a
result of talking to me. Why should Ruler II's willingness to discuss his
iniquitous (though sincerely held) moral belief generate an obligation on
'my part to obey? If a policy has sufficiently harmful consequences for me,
and the ruler sincerely believes the policy to be detrimental for me, then
why does his willingness to explain his reasoning to me generate even a
prima facie obligation for me to obey him?
So even if we add the condition that the ruler value tolerance and dis-
course to the sincere belief constraint, I do not find that we have a suffi-
cient condition for obligation. Ruler II still might seem to differ crucially
from Ruler III, who sincerely believes that his directives further my inter-
ests. But of course I have already claimed that the condition that the ruler
sincerely believe that his directives serve the common good is too
strong-one cannot point to the condition as necessary for law.
III. CONCLUSION
Soper's approach differs strikingly from those of other contemporary
legal theorists. He assumes from the beginning what many of us surely
believe-that we have some reason to obey law qua law. He posits an
ingredient which might serve as a bridge between legal theory and politi-
cal theory. But the ingredient admits of different interpretations Insofar
as "in the common good" has substantive content, it is too much to require
that officials believe their policies serve the common good, in order to have
law and obligation; and insofar as "in the common good" just means
"morally justified," it may be too little to ask. When one construes sub-
stantively "in the common good," many cases will arise in which officials
simply could not have a belief that their directives serve such a common
good; different policies serve the interests of various groups (even in the
long-term) very differently. I have suggested a refinement of Soper's the-
ory, clearly within the spirit of it, which may render it more plausible
(especially in the context of conflicts of interest).
I believe that Soper pays insufficient attention to the robust possibilities
of such conflicts of interest and their implications for his theory of obliga-
tion. And I want simply to suggest that this imbalance may result in part
from the model's focus on the family. Remember that Soper refers to the
"requirement that the parent is trying in good faith to act in the interests
of the child by acting in the interests of the family as a whole."5 In a
family, genuine conflicts of interest certainly do emerge, but the interests
56. P. 79.
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of the various members of the family are more closely related than those
of the various classes of most societies. When my parents suffer, I tend to
suffer also, and when I hurt, they do too. Interests are connected more
intimately in a family than in a society, and if one ignores this distinction,
one might underestimate the possibility that officials might pursue a pol-
icy which they sincerely believe to be morally justified but not in my in-
terest. Given that expectations of different classes do not tend to be
"chain-connected" (in Rawls' term) or to move together as the interests of
various members of a family might, Soper clearly owes us a more explicit
account of "common good" in order to allow for a proper evaluation of his
theory. While I have suggested some deficiencies in Soper's theory, I have
not impugned the general project (which I think has much interest): to say
what law is in such a way as to explain why I have reason to obey it, and
to undertake an explanation not in terms of utility or complicity, but in
terms of mutual respect.

